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South Africa Mobilises: The First Five Months of the War 




When war broke out in August 1914, the Union of South Africa found itself unprepared for what lay 
ahead. When the Imperial garrison left the Union during September 1914, supplies, equipment and a 
working knowledge of British military procedures reduced considerably. South Africa was, in effect, 
left starting from scratch. Yet, within five months and despite having to quell a rebellion, the Union 
was able to field an expeditionary force to invade German South West Africa and within a year agree 
to send forces to Europe and East Africa. This article explores how the Union Defence Force came of 
age in 1914. 
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1. Introduction 
In August 1914, South Africa, along with many other countries, found itself at war. It was unprepared 
for this eventuality – more so than most other countries. Yet, within six weeks of war being declared, 
the Union sent a force into neighbouring German South West Africa. This was a remarkable 
achievement considering the Union’s starting point, and that the government had to deal with a 
rebellion, which began with the invasion. 
The literature on South Africa’s involvement in World War 1 is increasing. Much of it focused 
on the war in Europe1 and, more recently, on East Africa2 with South West Africa3 starting to follow. 
However, the home front has been largely ignored with most literature focusing on the rebellion, 
which ran from September to December 1914.4 This article aims to explore South Africa’s 
preparedness for war and to shed some insight into the speed with and extent to which the government 
had to adapt in order to participate successfully in it. The article starts by setting out the military 
position of the Union in July 1914, followed by a broad overview of the political aspects concerning 
the war. Some actions the Union took to enable the invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) 
in mid- to late September 1914 and how the concurrent rebellion affected the Union’s preparations are 
discussed. The article concludes with a brief assessment of what had been achieved by the end of 
December 1914 when the Union in effect re-launched its invasion of the German colony following the 
rebellion. 
 
2. The military situation at the outbreak of war 
In July 1914, the Union Defence Force (UDF) was experiencing the growing pains of a typical two-
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year-old. It was trying to forge its identity and determine its place in the Union of South Africa, itself 
only four years young. The UDF came into being by an Act of Parliament in 1912, bringing together 
the various military bodies which had operated in each of the colonies from before Union. Between 
Union in 1910 and the formation of the UDF, the Defence Department consisted of the Minister for 
Defence, Jan Smuts, and his civilian under-secretary, HRM Bourne.5 In 1912, a core of 51 officers 
filled positions in the UDF headquarters in Pretoria and the 15 military regions across the country. 
The UDF consisted of the Permanent Force under Col. HT Lukin which was made up of five South 
African Mounted Rifle Regiments;6 the Active Citizen’s Force under Col. CF Beyers, consisting of 25 
155 men;7 and the Cadets (13–17-year-olds) under the leadership of Col. PS Beves. In addition to the 
UDF, the South African Police which, on 1 April 1913, numbered 5 882 men, was responsible for 
policing the towns. Rural policing fell to the South African Mounted Riflemen (SAMR) of the 
Permanent Force.8 Alongside these Union forces was the Imperial garrison under the command of the 
British War Office and the Officer Commanding South Africa.9 Although the UDF had been called 
into action to deal with strikes in 1913 and early 1914,10 the various groups still functioned separately, 
and these divisions led to “disjointed development of war planning and created distrust, even fission 
in the new structures”.11 The outbreak of war was to provide a catalyst to enforce change. 
Following the 1912 approval of the Defence Force, Bourne’s role was developed into a 
secretariat, which remained dominated by civilians. A General Staff was introduced to oversee the 
military organisation and an administration was formed to co-ordinate logistics and supplies.12 South 
Africa had a system in place to support the expansion of the armed forces but this was still in its 
infancy, having first been introduced in 1913. It included the “annual domestic service” or “peace 
training camps” where men aged 17 to 60 were called up in August to undergo military training over a 
period of four years.13  
 
3. The political situation at the outbreak of war 
The formation of the Union of South Africa on 31 May 1910 brought together two British-dominated 
territories, the Cape and Natal, and two Boer-dominated territories, the Orange River and Transvaal. 
The Act of Union made provision for an “Executive Government” which was “vested in the King”, 
and “administered by His Majesty in person or by a governor-general as His representative.” The 
Union was to be administered by an executive committee which would act as an advisory body. “The 
command in chief of the naval and military forces within the Union” was “vested in the King or 
Governor-General as His representative”.14 Legislative power was “vested in the Parliament of the 
Union”, consisting “of the King, a Senate, and a House of Assembly”, which met in Cape Town; 
Pretoria being the “seat of Government”. This meant decisions were made in Cape Town whilst 
administration was based in Pretoria – at least one whole day’s train journey away. The sessions of 
Parliament would be determined by the Governor-General and he could also “from time to time, by 
proclamation or otherwise, prorogue Parliament, and […] in like manner dissolve the Senate and the 
House of Assembly”. English and Dutch were the official languages.15  
Representing the white people in Parliament were various political parties. The governing 
South African Party led by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts represented a mix of Boer/Afrikaner and 
English speakers and was the most national of the parties. The SAP together with the English-
speaking Unionist Party, which in the main represented the mining magnates and those with strong 
ties to Britain, were pro-Empire. The anti-Empire sector was represented by the National Party, which 
had come into being in February 1914 after Louis Botha had left JBM Hertzog out of his cabinet. 
Bridging the pro- and anti-Empire positions was the Labour Party, which aligned itself with the 





represented by the Unionist Party. Leading the parties in the House of Assembly was the Prime 
Minister, Louis Botha of the South Africa Party.16 Black, coloured and Indian peoples had little 
political involvement although some coloureds, who met the requirements, were allowed the vote in 
the Cape. 
 
4. The outbreak of war 
As war loomed, South Africa was without its governor-general17 and prime minister. July was the 
holiday season, which allowed government officials to return to England to liaise with Colonial and 
War Offices and other departmental officials. At the beginning of July 1914, Viscount Gladstone, 
Governor-General of South Africa from 1910, returned to England having resigned his post. His 
replacement, Sydney Buxton, was due to leave for South Africa at the beginning of August and on his 
arrival in the country in September, Parliament would meet. In the interim, the post was filled by Lord 
Chief Justice Sir John Henry de Villiers and when he died three days before Buxton’s arrival, by Sir 
James Rose Innes, Attorney General.18 On 1 August 1914, Prime Minister Louis Botha, was ending a 
tour of Southern Rhodesia where he had been campaigning for the British South African Company 
chartered territory to join the Union. Botha, having been warned of the pending outbreak of war by 
the South African agent to London, David Graaff, returned overland rather than sail from Beira in 
Portuguese East Africa on a German ship as initially planned.19 Had Botha sailed, it is likely he would 
have been the only head of state to be taken prisoner during the war. 
On 4 August 1914, the day Britain declared war on Germany, the Union government, with 
Botha safely in the chair, reassured London of its support. In response, Britain, on 6 August, asked 
South Africa to “seize such part of German South West Africa as will give them the command of 
Luderitzbucht, Swakopmund and the wireless stations there or in the interior”.20 In Pretoria, Botha 
called his cabinet together on 7 August, to discuss the situation, extending the remit from one of 
destroying the wireless stations to invading and capturing the entire German colony. The cabinet was 
divided but Botha won his point by warning his colleagues that there was nothing to prevent Britain 
from asking Australia or India to undertake the task. Despite their fear of dividing white South Africa 
and re-opening wounds, which had slowly started to heal after the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, FS 
Malan and his fellow dissenters agreed with Botha. There was no objection to the Union undertaking 
its own defence and allowing the Imperial garrison to return to Britain,21 a move which Britain 
welcomed, and all but one and a quarter battalions left for Europe on 27 August taking all their 
equipment with them.22 The remaining Imperial troops relocated to the Castle in Cape Town23 where, 
under the command of Maj. Gen. Charles Thompson, they provided South Africa with much-needed 
advice and support. 
The cabinet having agreed to take on the defence of the Union and to invade GSWA triggered 
the Ministry of Defence into action. Although steps could be taken to prepare for the invasion, 
permission to invade could only be given when Parliament sat a month later, in September, and there 
was no guarantee that members would approve the move. This meant that some preparations had to be 
kept out of the public domain as they would contravene the spirit of the Defence Act. Others, 
however, could be actioned under the guise of protecting the Union against potential attack.24 
 
5. Planning the campaign and protecting the Union 
Despite there being a fair bit to do, the Union government was not under the same pressure as Britain 





GSWA. With the Kalahari Desert being the main feature of the countryside, it was unlikely an attack 
would come from there, but one had to be prepared. The rush, ostensibly to fulfil the British 
(Admiralty) request to put the wireless stations out of action, was really to ensure the German colony 
would fall to the Union before the war was over.25 The Union government knew what it was up 
against as the challenges of the territory had been set out in the Military report on GSWA 1913 and a 
number of South Africans had ‘insider’ information. These included Capt. Johan Leipoldt, a 
Namakwalander, and Thomas Cullinan, who had prospected in the Kuruman area.26 The speed with 
which government looked to invade GSWA meant that a combination of systems and processes was 
used, resulting in apparent confusion and a lack of organisation.27 
The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in Durban was mobilised on 5 August, whilst the Natal 
units of the Defence Force, including the Durban Light Infantry and Natal Carbineers, mobilised on 8 
August to protect against coastal invasion and to relieve the Imperial garrison, which left Durban on 
12 August 1914 for Cape Town.28 Additional forces were put on alert following the apparent sighting 
of the SS Königsberg 18 miles off the Durban coast, and an ‘examination service’ started to assess all 
ships which entered the port.29  
The naval commander-in-chief, Admiral Herbert King Hall, was in an unenviable position. He 
was, until October 1914, responsible for the whole coastline around southern Africa stretching from St 
Helena on the west coast to Mombasa on the east. He had three out-dated cruisers with which to patrol 
the waters – HMS Pegasus, Astrea and Hyacinth – until HMS Pegasus was sunk in Zanzibar harbour 
by SS Königsberg on 20 September 1914.30 In addition to patrolling the waters, until Königsberg was 
spotted on 30 October in the Rufiji Delta, King Hall was responsible for protecting the ports against 
invasion and preventing German commercial shipping from reaching its destination. Already by 20 
August, three German ships had been apprehended and passed to the Prize Courts. The award of a 
prize ship would significantly improve transport opportunities for the country involved. Yet, King 
Hall could only start proceedings to claim prize ships after he had received the Prize Court Rules on 
18 September.31 Claims needed to be prepared and cases made for why the Union should be awarded a 
ship rather than, for example, Australia, which often had a claim over the same ship as it was 
scheduled to make a delivery there but was caught in South African waters or vice versa.32  
The need for shipping to support the campaign in GSWA was great, and boats of all sizes were 
sourced from wherever possible. The Durban Light Infantry historian recorded surprise when, on 
arrival at Walfisch Bay, the regiment came across the Durban tug Sir John, which was doing its bit to 
support the war effort.33 Apart from sourcing vessels for various functions, King Hall had to arrange 
for the Imperial garrison to be transported and escorted back to Europe as well as supply the transport 
and escort for the Union’s expeditionary forces invading GSWA. He had at his disposal the Union 
Castle line, but that only solved part of his problem as escort ships were scarce. The date for 
transporting the South African expeditionary force therefore moved from 5 to 12 September when 
Astrea was promised as escort. However, this deadline, too, moved to 14 September due to poor 
weather conditions, and then to 26 September.34 By then, the rebellion had started. 
 
6. The rebellion 
The rebellion was to prove a blessing in disguise for the Union government. Planning for the invasion 
of GSWA had started in Pretoria during August. Those present included Smuts, Beyers, Lukin, 
McKenzie, Beves, Col. PCB Skinner on loan from the British Army and the General Manager of 
Railways, Sir William Hoy. On 17 August, the Governor-General was informed of the arrangements 





reported trespassing on Union territory at Nakob.36 This was announced in the press on 21 August. 
The ground was set, fortuitously or contrived, to justify the Union invasion of its neighbour.37 On 30 
August, 1 500 men and 1 300 animals left for Port Nolloth, Northern Cape, in preparation for the 
invasion of GSWA.38 By the time Parliament met and agreed to the invasion by 92 votes to 12, 
preparations appeared complete as orders to entrain and attack GSWA were given on Tuesday 15 
September 1914 – the day Generals Beyers and Kemp resigned their posts starting phase one of the 
rebellion. The government accepted the resignations on 19 September when letters from both Beyers 
and government were published in the press.39 An exacerbating factor, often treated as an 
inconsequential sideshow, was the hunt for the Foster Gang, which resulted in the accidental death of 
Gen. De la Rey on 15 September. Gen. Beyers who was in the car with De la Rey claimed that the 
shooting had been a deliberate act ordered by Botha and Smuts, thereby increasing the tensions 
between the pro- and anti-British factions. 40 
Although the Defence Department had numerous resignations to process, including rifle 
collection,41 contingency plans were put in place due to the questionable loyalty of senior military 
officers such as Beyers, SG (Manie) Maritz and Jopie Fourie. Already in early September, 
McKenzie’s orders had been changed without Beyers being told.42 Maritz and a force of 1 000 with no 
artillery were sent towards Kakamas and Upington, and Lukin was sent to Steinkopf on 20 September 
“to establish a base for operations [...] while the Union Department of Defence was busily engaged in 
organising a field force for the conquest of [GSWA]”.43 Steps were also taken to invest Lüderitzbucht 
and Swakopmund in order to put the wireless stations out of action. The need to occupy these bases, 
Lüderitzbucht in particular, was made more urgent by unrest which was flaring in Walfisch Bay and 
the navy’s concern that it could not protect shipping or the ports due to commitments on the east 
African coast. On 18 September, Lüderitzbucht was occupied without a shot fired, and eight days 
later, the battle of Grassplatz took place, 19 kilometres east of the port. Four men of the Imperial 
Light Horse were killed as were four Germans.44 The same day, 26 September, the South Africans 
suffered a major setback at Sandfontein at which 16 South Africans and 14 Germans lost their lives.45 
Two days later, the Union government agreed to withdraw the magistrate and residents from Walfisch 
Walvis Bay until the town’s security could be ensured.46 No doubt, the decision was influenced by the 
losses at Sandfontein and Grassplatz despite Beves’s report only being written on 3 October.47 
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Louis Botha took to the field as commander-in-chief. He led the 
loyal forces against the rebels and insisted that the only way the invasion of the German colony would 
succeed was if he personally commanded the expedition. This led to a reworking of the invasion 
strategy, which was presented to Buxton on 8 October. Botha and Smuts had never had to co-ordinate 
with another military body, especially naval, in any of their previous campaigns. Therefore, the 
month-old Governor-General took the opportunity to bring the Union planners together with the 
British naval commander for the Cape squadron. Action was dependent on the availability of the Navy 
and would utilise the various guns the Imperial authorities had placed at the disposal of the Union.48 
On 9 October 1914, the naval commander-in-chief telegrammed to Buxton that he was – 
coming to Pretoria by special train on Sunday at 11am [...] I should be glad to proceed 
immediately to discussion of matters mentioned in your secret telegram of 7 October 1914, so that 
if possible I can leave again on Sunday evening. I am bringing Captain [RCK] Lambert with me 
and can leave him behind at Pretoria if necessary to arrange any details.49  
Whilst these plans were being finalised, the Union government, with Botha in the field and kept 
up to date by daily telephone calls to Smuts,50 continued to work at bringing the rebellion to an end, 
whilst the Governor-General continued to do what he could to assist the Union government in 





November when information received from the Admiralty caused the Walfisch Bay expedition to be 
postponed for a fortnight. By then, it was hoped that the marauding German squadron would be 
accounted for. In the meantime, it was anticipated that an early arrangement could be arrived at to 
convey the bulk of 2 000 men and some guns to reinforce McKenzie.52 
 
7. To recruit or not 
Determining the size of the force needed to protect the Union and to invade GSWA required careful 
thought and constant adjustment to meet the changing circumstances. Initially, on 4 August 1914, it 
was thought that only the Permanent Force would be used, which was in keeping with the Defence 
Act, as the use of volunteers especially outside of the Union would require permission from 
Parliament. Gordon Wills, a young traveller, wrote to his mother from a “train to Pretoria” on 14 
August 1914, “Everything […] is quiet up here and there is a large notice that no volunteers are 
wanted though I expect that to be ended shortly”.53 Wills was right. Smuts was in communication with 
senior military officers about using volunteers and on 8 August, permission had been obtained from 
London to mobilise the Union and Imperial forces.54 A few days later, Smuts telegrammed to Col. 
Charles Crewe, member of the Union Parliament and owner of an East London newspaper, regarding 
a statement issued to the press that afternoon, 11 August: 
to the effect that Government propose to organise and equip an adequate force to provide for 
contingencies and that besides Defence Force stop My idea is to have outside Defence Force one 
volunteer regiment for Natal one for East London Port Elizabeth and surrounding districts and two 
in the interior [...] Do you agree generally stop [...]55 
In response, Crewe recommended that officers be drawn from the SAMR or police and that they 
choose their own men.56 The same day, Smuts explained to McKenzie – 
[...] we are to a large extent dependent on the lead given us by the Imperial Government and are in 
communication with them. In the meantime, we think it our duty to organise and mobilise a 
fighting force in case of eventualities. From a notice issued yesterday [...] you will see that we 
intend calling not only our Defence Forces but also to a limited extent on outside volunteers.57 
Ten days later, the situation had changed following the German incursion at Nakob. McKenzie 
would now be expected to “attempt the occupation of Luderitzbucht and Swakopmund. No volunteer 
regiment has been organised.”58 A month later, with the rebellion underway, Smuts informed Denys 
Reitz that only volunteers would be used and that no commandeering would take place.59 The concern 
about commandeering had been exacerbated by the annual domestic service call-up, which had taken 
place at the same time as the news of war that had broken out. Using volunteers would avoid having 
to deal with anti-British feeling in the Active Citizen’s Force, which was becoming more apparent as 
plans for the invasion of GSWA progressed. In addition, the use of volunteers would go some way to 
maintaining a balance between the demands of the war and rebellion with the increased white fears of 
black uprisings. Withdrawing the rural police, the SAMR or Permanent Force exacerbated this fear as 
noted by concerned citizens in Alexandria, East London District.60 Allowing men to stay and protect 
their property would reduce hostility towards government.  
Various routes were, therefore, used to obtain troops. The traditional commando system was put 
into action where many of the commando leaders who were serving officers in the UDF went out to 
recruit their followers. As a result, the forces serving in GSWA were recorded as Botha’s Horse, De la 
Rey’s Scouts and so on. Some citizens felt their duty lay in offering their services, for example, 
Crewe, who had written to Botha on 6 August 1914, and Thomas Cullinan of Premier Mines.61 Others 





asked to help.63 Finally, individuals were seconded from other departments or forces and asked to lead 
a regiment, for example, Lt Col. MM Hartigan of the police. 
Hartigan’s account of his appointment shows how quickly things could move if needed. He was 
ordered to Pretoria by Smuts after the defeat of the South Africans at Sandfontein64 on 26 September 
1914, and asked how long it would take to raise a mounted regiment: a month if he could use a 
squadron of South African Police and Southern Rifles from the Transkei where he was based. Smuts 
approved –  
On leaving Defence HQ, I went to see the Commissioner of Police, Smuts’s Secretary had already 
telephoned him and the Minister for Justice, and my immediate secondment for Active Service 
was approved. The authority for formation of a regiment of four squadrons to be known as 
Hartigan’s Horse appeared in Union Defence Force orders that night.65 
In addition to the communications, which the above arrangements entailed, the Union 
government also had to deal with enthusiastic individuals who were recruiting contingents for service 
in Europe. Within a week of the incursion at Nakob, Capt. E Beardmore of the Legion of 
Frontiersmen Cape Colony and Rhodesia Commands offered 250 men at 48 hours’ notice to 
government if needed. This was declined the next day. Yet, a week later, on 1 September 1914, 
Beardmore wrote to John Parker, the mayor of Cape Town, that recruiting in the City Hall vestibule 
that day had been successful. They enlisted 18 men in addition to their existing 250. He did not 
“consider it advisable to continue tomorrow for fear of enlisting those of an undesirable class and 
moreover to protect the claims for service of the present command”.66 Two weeks later, on 14 
September, James Wolfe Murray, Army Headquarters Cape Castle, notified Parker that the War Office 
had declined any further recruits from South Africa except for those needed to complete the unit 
strengths of the British forces already in the Union. Two days later, however, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick and 
Col. Byron in conjunction with Sir Aubrey Woolls Sampson had placed an article in the press for men 
to volunteer. Within days, on 19 September, Buxton urgently telegraphed London noting, “Ministers 
would deprecate recruitment at present of any such contingent” as they were about to issue a call for 
7 000 veterans to volunteer for service in GSWA. Government sought permission to add to their call a 
message from the Imperial government that “it would not encourage recruitment of oversea 
contingent until satisfied [that Union requirements were fully met]”.67 This contrasts with a letter 
Smuts sent to the of Cape Town a week earlier notifying him that the Defence Force was not in a 
position to enlist further recruits.68 The Union government was clearly reacting to changing 
circumstances rather than following a defined policy.  
Some, however, did appear to work in conjunction with the authorities as noted by Percival F 
Smith69 of the People’s Legion:70  
Activities: The Legion is at present confining its activities to dealing with men who either cannot 
or will not enlist in the Botha Army or the Defence Force. All men who are eligible for those 
forces are being urged by the Legion to go forward to the City Hall. It is found that there are a 
number of men who have served in the Imperial Army and who desire to rejoin their old 
regiments. The Legion is dealing with applications from such men, and is trying to send such men 
to England. It seems but natural that these men should be given a chance of rejoining the colours. 
It must be remembered that the Legion will not send away men who are wanted by the Union 
Government and whose services can be obtained for the Government. It is only sending away men 
whose services are not forthcoming for local purposes who have special qualifications for serving 
in the British army, and whom Earl Kitchener has said he will be very glad to receive. Seventy six 
of such men have already been sent. It is estimated that to send 25 men each week costs £350. The 






Over the next ten days, updates appeared on the progress of recruitment for Overseas 
Contingent No 4. On 8 October, it was noted that the contingent of 50 men would be sailing at the end 
of the following week. But, when the Commandant of Rhodesia was unable to entrain men to reach 
Cape Town in time for the ship to leave, the People’s Legion recruited additional men to fill these 
spaces. They sailed on 17 October on RMS Norman after parading for inspection by Maj. Gen. 
Thompson who had replaced Wolfe Murray as senior commander of the Imperial garrison. 
Over time and alongside the traditional recruitment routes, the 15 military centres across the 
Union became centres for recruitment, eventually becoming more aligned under the Director for 
Recruiting, CP Crewe, in Pretoria.71 On 25 September 1914, magistrates and police officers across the 
Union were asked to assist the Director “as much as possible”.72 Recruitment drives were organised 
where politicians and senior military officials were sent to rally men to enlist. This may well account 
for the work of the People’s Legion described above. However, not all recruitment drives were well 
thought out as noted by Col. Coen Brits, a Boer, being sent to “English” East London. After Brits had 
left, local senior officers offered to raise a “complete mounted regiment” for service in East Africa if 
they could have Hartigan as their commander. Hartigan’s appointment to 9th South African Horse was 
realised on 26 September, by which time the number of civil servants and police enlisting had started 
to affect the running of the country, and Botha banned staff resigning and secondment to the armed 
forces for the remainder of the war.73 
Recruitment stations were developed, with all they entailed. Attestation forms needed 
processing so men could be paid. This was to be a complex process as there were different rates 
depending on where men served and in which capacity.74 Separation allowances and having payments 
sent to different family members added to the processes. Recruiting administrators were to ensure that 
applicants met the requirements in terms of age and ethnicity – no person of colour or of enemy 
background was to be enlisted into the armed regiments of the Union Defence Force. Doctors had to 
be recruited to complete the medical tests all men had to undergo before being allowed to progress to 
training. Each recruit underwent two medicals: one at the local recruitment centre and another, more 
detailed medical, on arrival at one of the training camps. Camps were set up around the country, the 
main centre being at Tempe near Bloemfontein. Others included Potchefstroom, Rosebank in Cape 
Town, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Booysens in Johannesburg, and Pretoria. Here, men were brought 
together in their units and equipped before embarking on a ship. Directing men to the various training 
centres required careful planning as reservations on trains needed to be made and confirmed, meals 
booked and transport arranged for getting to and from the stations. Communications needed to be 
made with the receiving destination and finance departments to ensure the recruit was expected and to 
account for any expenses incurred.75 A similar process was followed in getting men embarked for 
GSWA. 
 
8. Equipping and moving the forces 
It was one thing getting the men, but they needed equipment, especially as most ordnance in the 
Union had left with the Imperial garrison. Before the garrison departed, the desperation of the Union’s 
position was set out on 17 August 1914 to the Commander in Chief South Africa and Acting High 
Commissioner:76 
Ministers are being pressed to take active steps in German South West Africa, and yet, when they 
ask for certain equipment from the Imperial stores, they are informed that the only things that can 
be given them are certain vehicles whose serviceableness is under grave suspicion [... Can we] 
have issued to us signalling and, especially medical equipment, of which we are very short, and 





ambulances and water carts.77 
This followed on from a telegram, 12 August, from the Secretary of State for Colonies to the 
Acting Governor General: 
Artillery which your Ministers desire to retain is urgently required at Home in view of impending 
military operations on a large scale. It is realised by His Majesty's Government that your 
Government has not yet had the time necessary to organise strong forces of Artillery in the highest 
state of efficiency, but they feel confident that forces of Union as they stand will prove equal to 
the task of seizing Colonies of main importance in enemy’s territory, and they believe this will 
probably prove tantamount to conquest of whole.78 
The Union government was quite aware of its shortages and the unlikelihood of getting 
anything from London as evidenced by requests to other territories on 10 August. Australia eventually 
supplied ten million rounds of ammunition, whilst New Zealand had none to spare.79 India supplied “a 
much needed lot of QF gun ammunition […] for use in the neighbouring German territory”.80 Two 
guns were sent from Malta with no personnel. However, by not sending the Royal Garrison Artillery 
to St Helena, Thompson could supply six officers and 148 other ranks to man these and the other guns 
which the Imperial Army and Navy had supplied.81 Weapons and ammunition were also provided by 
the Portuguese.82 Despite these arrangements, communications continued between South African and 
London regarding the need for guns and ammunition, even after the expeditionary forces had landed 
in the German colony.  
To add to the complexity and anxieties around obtaining weapons, there were specifications 
around which ammunition could be used. Shortly after being provided with “flat-nosed revolver 
bullets (so called Dum-Dum)”, the officers of the UDF were informed they had to be withdrawn and 
replaced by pointed-nosed bullets. The same would have to happen with the ammunition issued to 
McKenzie’s force.83 The ammunition supplied by the Portuguese was also found to be faulty, which 
resulted in Botha asking Collyer to investigate.84 
The availability of equipment – or lack thereof – was one thing, but it was another when the 
items were available and not getting through to where they were needed. This resulted in Farrar 
complaining to Crewe. Rather than, as suggested, appointing a small committee to address the 
difficulties being encountered with the Defence Department, Smuts preferred to appoint government 
inspectors and an extra assistant to the Quartermaster General. He, Smuts, would also consult the 
British government for advice on administering supplies.85 This resulted in Skinner’s appointment to 
Botha’s staff to sort out the lines of communication. The additional appointment and inspectors had an 
effect as Botha noted on 27 February 1915 that “off-loading is so much improved and [...] we off-
loaded and disembarked Brits with his right wing and all their kit in one day, and, imagine it 1 440 
animals and 500 tons of fodder and food in ten days”. This contrasted with the ‘bad mess’ when he 
arrived.86  
Other supply issues concerned uniforms and water. Keene identified “inter alia six different 
types of headgear, three patterns of bandolier equipment worn in various manners, two patterns of 
leggings, and pimlico of differing material and cut, worn haphazardly” in a photograph taken of forces 
in GSWA.87 As the commander of the 4th (Umvoti) Mounted Rifles explained, he either had to wait 
three months for material to come from England to be made into uniforms or delve into the 
emergency supplies of the Active Citizens’ Force.88  
Most of the South African forces were mounted. Although men supplied their own horses as 
indicated by Hartigan, the horses needed to be fed and watered, blacksmiths and farriers were required 





that replacements were regularly required resulting in systems needing to be introduced in the Union 
to locate, purchase and transport them, and food, to where required on the front.89 Other personnel 
included drivers, leaders for mules and donkeys, and herders of cattle (‘food on the hoof’). The use of 
black, Indian and coloured labour meant that interpreters and men who could oversee labour 
contingents were required. White men who knew the language and were known to the men and their 
ways were recruited from administrative roles in black areas to oversee labour.90 This, in turn, created 
other challenges as those who enlisted from the civil service, before Botha’s ban, were not to be 
replaced.91 As labour needs increased, so the Union began to draw on others, such as the mines, which 
made use of short-term contracted labour, to provide labour. Men were recruited on condition that 
they first served alongside the UDF and then took up their work with the mine.92 The mines provided 
assistance where they could: labour, soldiers and expertise such as that offered by Cullinan and asked 
for of Farrar, a mine owner.  
Farrar was a railway expert whose skills would be invaluable to rebuilding the lines in GSWA 
to the South African gauge and supporting McKenzie in his drive inland. In addition to the laying of 
lines in and to the German colony, logistical arrangements needed to be put in place to ensure the 
smooth transport of supplies and men. This required the appointment of men familiar with signals and 
communication systems between the stations.93 The importance of the railways to the Union’s 
endeavours was demonstrated by the appointment of Sir William Hoy as Director of Military 
Railways with the rank of colonel.94 This ensured military requirements were given priority over 
domestic demands. This was important for co-ordinating the trains used in the rebellion. Botha’s 
strategy was to rail his troops and horses to where they were needed in an attempt to keep them as 
fresh as possible. Trains were also used for transporting captured rebels to internment bases. On top of 
all their military and usual domestic work, the railway staff was also responsible for transporting gifts 
and comforts collected for the men serving.95 
Motorised transport was used in both GSWA and South Africa as evidenced by Whittall’s 
Armoured Car Contingent and the No. 2 Special Motor Car Contingent respectively. The latter, 
organised by the Transvaal Automobile Club and consisting of 110 cars supplied by DH Saker and 
Company, was instrumental in rounding up Christian de Wet.96 Other motorised vehicles, which 
needed to be sourced, transported and manned, included cranes, trucks for moving cargo, and 
ambulances. When the motorised vehicles failed to function due to a shortage of petrol or as a result 
of sand being too soft or affecting the mechanics, horse or wagon was used.97  
November 1914 saw Major Wallace called from the Western Front to return to England for the 
purpose of making the necessary arrangements for the formation of a South African aviation corps to 
assist the Union expeditionary force in the campaign against German South West Africa. 
Wallace’s account of setting up his aviation corps provides another first-hand account of the 
challenges faced: 
On reporting to the War Office I was informed that everything had been arranged and only 
organisation was necessary. It was found however that practically nothing had been done and no 
arrangements whatever made. It was impossible to obtain either machines, transport, tools, 
material or men from the War Office owing to their requirements and as it seemed doubtful at that 
time that it would be possible to get the Corps together at all, the remaining South African 
Officers who were with the Expeditionary Force in Flanders were not recalled. [...] got a contract 







9. Other essential functions 
The Department of Defence also had other matters to deal with and organise.  
Medical services were split between the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) linked with the 
Imperial garrison and the South African Medical Corps (SAMC). When the Imperial garrison left the 
Union, four of the five RAMC hospitals were closed. This left three military hospitals in the Union: 
one at the Castle, one in Simon’s Town and the RAMC hospital at Wynburg. A limited staff were 
‘transferred on loan’ to the UDF. To complete the complement of staff needed, members of the SAMC 
were called up under the Defence Act and others recruited. Nurses were supplied by the South African 
Nursing Service. With the invasion of GSWA, a second general hospital was opened at Maitland in 
Cape Town. In addition, two ships were equipped: the City of Athens as hospital transport and the 
Ebani as a hospital ship.99 By the end of the GSWA campaign, the Ebani had transported 3 206 
patients100 who were distributed between the hospitals and three convalescent homes in Kalk Bay, 
Wynburg and Johannesburg. 
Important to the moving of men and equipment was communication. For this purpose, the 
telegram was crucial. The outbreak of war meant that urgent telegrams could be received at any time 
of day or night resulting in arrangements needing to be made for an all-night service.101 On 30 
September, the Governor-General approved the formation of “the South African Field Post and 
Telegraph Corps” which consisted of 500 all ranks split into a signal and postal division. Two days 
later an order went out that all telegrams which needed to be “enciphered or coded” were to be sent to 
Mr McNeight who was responsible for the Coding Staff.102 There had been instances of codes falling 
into German hands and secret messages sent on open lines, which compromised shipping lines.103 It 
was recommended that, if possible, typists should also be stenographers to enable them to be as 
versatile as possible.104 In the field – 
the method adopted [to send a telegram to GHQ was] to send a telegraphist two miles to the 
nearest telegraph line twice a day over the most appalling track it is possible to imagine, there he 
had to climb the telegraph pole and cut into the line.105 
Censorship was initially managed from Pretoria, but relocated to Cape Town after army 
headquarters had moved there.106 This eased pressure on the Union government which took upon itself 
to monitor and censor mail passing through Portuguese East Africa as it was known that the neutral 
territory was being used as a communication channel for the Germans in East Africa.107 In addition to 
the processes the Union had in place, the British government ordered or offered advice. For example, 
on 17 September 1914 it recommended that the “procedure for dealing with postal matter for or from 
enemy territory is to accept but not to forward such correspondence. It is opened and letters of no 
importance are destroyed.”108 
Internal security was crucial too, although it took until 12 October to introduce Martial Law.109 
Steps had however been put in place as noted by Hans Neuhaus, later Henry Newhouse, a German-
born mining magnate who had become a British citizen in 1907. On 9 September, he noted: 
the position of alien enemies, local Germans and Austrians are being treated apparently differently 
to those at Home. None of them are allowed to leave the Union without a permit and such of them 
as are Reservists have been arrested and confined in the Agricultural Show Grounds. These men 
are still being collected from all over South Africa and Rhodesia for this purpose. The others are 
not being interfered with at all.110 
The limited police force was further stretched as concerned citizens requested guards over 
ordnance stores, especially where large numbers of Germans were present or where natives knew the 





weapons and moving away from coastal areas. Whilst camps were set up to accommodate those who 
were felt to be a threat, others were spied on, such as Phillip Pretorius, the South African hunter who 
lived in German East Africa and who fled to South Africa at the outbreak of war. Pretorius records 
that De la Rey’s sister had been sent by the Union government to spy on him.112  
In addition to the internment camps, prisoner-of-war camps needed to be organised and 
managed for those Germans captured in GSWA. Transporting these prisoners required escorts, which 
depleted the fighting forces back on the front and special arrangements with the railways which 
transported the men to their destination.113 Reports had to be compiled and sent to the Red Cross in 
line with the Geneva Convention and enquiries into the whereabouts of individuals made when 
requested. On occasion, this involved investigation into the person’s background to determine 
nationality as Hungarians and Austrians were treated differently compared to Germans. Investigations 
and motivations were also required to determine whether prisoners were to be exchanged or deported. 
When German officers were given parole, monitoring their whereabouts needed to be undertaken to 
ensure adherence. Incarceration of the rebels and arranging legal proceedings against them took up 
further valuable resources, as did the management of the fines many were required to pay. 
 
10. Business as usual 
Alongside the arrangements touched on above and others not featured for reasons of space, the South 
African government still had the usual business of the land to oversee. On 8 September 1914, 
Parliament met to welcome the Governor-General and to approve South African forces serving 
outside the Union. A glance at the Hansard Index for the parliamentary session indicates that the war 
took up a very small part of the proceedings, which lasted three days. The rebellion started the 
following week as a result of the decisions made and in October, Botha took over as commander-in-
chief of the UDF, combining this with his role as prime minister. His being in the field meant much of 
his political work fell onto the shoulders of Smuts. 
The biggest issue was finance as it was one area where the political opposition could challenge 
the government without being accused of treason. Budgets and costs had to be monitored to ensure no 
excessive spending, and equipment – military, medical and commercial – had to be sourced, if not 
from within the Union, then from outside. The demands of the war in Europe often meant that the 
Union had to find alternative markets or products. In addition, enquiries were made and steps put in 
place to prevent extortion through price-fixing.114 Some of these functions fell into the remit of 
existing departments, such as finance and trade; however, the exigencies of war resulted in additional 
staff being needed, or work being added to already overstretched officials. Any additional finance 
expenditure had to be approved by parliament, which invariably led to objections by the Nationalists 
who felt the local economy should receive preference. As a result, where possible, Buxton would 
approach the Imperial government for funding to help reduce political pressure on Smuts and Botha 
who had to present and defend the case in the House of Assembly.115 
Pressure came from outside the House too. Concerned family members wanted to know the 
whereabouts of 1 500 coloured citizens working in German territory.116 On their return to the Union, 
government had to consider whether to accept the German bank notes these men had been given as 
there was no guarantee that the Union would be reimbursed for honouring the value of the money.117 
Offers of service provision also had to be considered by the quartermaster general’s office. These 
included offers to run canteens and to supply water or carrier pigeons. Others wrote in with inventions 
they had created or had heard about, such as balloons, in the hope that it would assist the armed forces 





The pressure of the previous four and a half months was telling when, on 19 December 1914, 
uncharacteristically, Smuts wrote to JX Merriman, senior statesman, “I have never posed as a 
financial expert and as you know I am half dead with my efforts in quite another direction so you 
must be good and help.”119 Following prompts by Buxton and consultations with Botha, David Graaff 
joined the cabinet on 24 February 1915, having been brought back from London for reasons of health. 
He became Minister of Finance, technically relieving Smuts and Merriman of the task.120  
 
11. Conclusion 
By February 1915, the situation in South Africa caused by Britain’s declaration of war on Germany 
had calmed enough for Smuts to join Botha in GSWA from April 1915 indicating that by then, the 
defence department was sufficiently organised to look after itself. The rebellion had been brought to a 
close by early December 1914 and at the end of the month, the campaign against GSWA was 
effectively relaunched. With Botha in the driving seat, the GSWA campaign was brought to an end on 
9 July 1915. This did not stop the Nationalists in their objection to the war, and their outcries were to 
influence the demobilisation plans and subsequent recruitment for service in Europe, East Africa and 
other theatres.121  
Despite the hurdles the Nationalists and others put in the way, the transformation the UDF had 
undergone was evident in the organisation of the forces eventually sent to East Africa in 1916 and to 
Europe by late 1915. Most noticeably, the commando system was done away with, although units, 
which had fought in GSWA, were generally kept together in the East Africa brigade. Although there 
were still errors caused by inexperience, such as the calculation of reinforcements being ignored, the 
compilation and processing of recruiting men for service after GSWA were more structured and 
documented than at the start of the war. The Union still had lessons to learn in terms of supplying the 
troops and dealing with variable terrain, but given its starting point, it had come a long way. 
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